By Nureddin Sabir
Editor, Redress Information & Analysis

The Libyan National Army (LNA) has decided to pull back by two to three kilometres on all fronts around the capital Tripoli. A statement by the LNA’s official spokesman, Major-General Ahmad al-Mismari, posted on an LNA Facebook page on 19 May, said the purpose of the withdrawal is to allow residents of the capital to celebrate Eid al-Fitr, the festival marking the end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, and visit relatives. It also called on the militias of the unelected “Government of National Accord” (GNA) to reciprocate, which they are most unlikely to do as that would stem their recently acquired momentum. 

The GNA is backed by the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda, myriad other Islamist terrorist and organised crime groups, thousands of Syrian mercenaries and Islamist cutthroats brought to Libya by Turkey’s Islamist and Ottoman revivalist President Recep Erdogan, and Turkish military personnel and drones. It is also backed by Qatar, Britain and Italy.

The LNA, on the other hand, is supported, to a much lesser extent than Turkey’s support for the GNA, by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Russia.

Since April 2019 the LNA has been fighting to liberate Tripoli from the Islamist and organised crime militias of the GNA. However, massive Turkish military intervention on behalf of the GNA has drastically changed the military equation, forcing the LNA to announce a ceasefire in January and then again in April — a monumental strategic blunder that has allowed the GNA militias to organise themselves, absorb the newly-acquired Turkish military wherewithal, and integrate the Turkish military personnel and the Syrian mercenaries and terrorists into their ranks. 

The decision to pull back from the fronts in Tripoli comes just one day after the LNA lost Al-Watiya air force base, west of Tripoli, to the GNA militias and Turkish forces. The loss, described by the LNA as a “tactical withdrawal”, cannot be described as anything other than the most significant setback for the LNA since it launched its campaign to liberate Tripoli from the GNA’s Islamist and organised crime militias. 

Victory for Turkish expansionism

The loss of Al-Watiya represents a major victory for Turkish expansionism. According to Libyan political analyst Mohamed Eljarh, who benefits from many contacts inside Libya, Turkish troops participated directly in the attack on Al-Watiya, with a naval frigate, Anka-S and Barkytar drones, and around 800 Syrian mercenaries — dwarfing the 250 GNA gunmen who took part in the assault.

Al-Watiya’s loss also represent a significant humiliation for the LNA’s backers, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, highlighting their lack of resolve — in stark contrast to Erdogan’s iron-clad commitment to the Muslim Brotherhood / Al-Qaeda-backed GNA. 

To add to the humiliation of Egypt and the UAE, American officials have been cited as saying that they “share strategic interests with Turkey as far as Syria and Libya are concerned” and that Washington had “approved Turkey’s action in Syria and in Libya”. As Eljarh correctly asks in a tweet: is this just approval or is there more to it? Is the US providing the Turks with advanced military technology and intelligence? If true, US support for Turkey’s activities in Libya is a huge slap in the face especially for Egypt’s President Abd-al-Fattah al-Sisi, who has been reduced to repeating worn out mantra about Egypt’s commitment to eliminating terrorism in Libya. 

The US volte-face on Libya comes head on the heals of reports that Turkey has managed to absorb Tunisia and Algeria into its sphere of influence. Libyan news website AfrigateNews reported on 19 May that Tunisian parliament Speaker and head of Ennahda Party (the Tunisian Muslim Brotherhood) Rachid Ghannouchi has congratulated GNA chief Fayiz al-Sarraj on the the capture of Al-Watiya air force base. This is not surprising, given Ghannouchi’s position as head of a major Islamist organisation. In fact, Tunisia has long been suspected of acting as a conduit for Turkish arms supples to the GNA’s Islamist and organised crime militias — a duplicitous role given its repeated pledges of neutrality in the Libyan conflict. What is surprising is reports that Algeria — which has its own Islamist terrorism problems — and the GNA are close to signing a mutual defence pact, another win for Erdogan, who is said to have been instrumental in bringing this about. 

What next?

In view of this state of affairs, what can we expect to happen in Libya? According to Eljarh, two scenarios are possible:

1. The LNA accepting the impossibility of its military situation against Turkey and external backers not stepping up to the plate.
2. The LNA’s external backers preparing a major escalation, including direct intervention.

Given that both Egypt and the UAE are US client-states and are unlikely to cross Washington, whatever policy it adopts, the second scenario is highly unlikely. According to a report by the Egyptian news website Mada Masr on 19 May, Egypt and the UAE have already decided to end their support for the LNA and its commander-in-chief, Khalifa Haftar. If true, that would have huge repercussions for Libya, Egypt and the whole of North Africa and the Middle East. It would be a major victory not just for Erdogan and his project to revive the Ottoman Empire in the Arabic-speaking world, but also for Islamist terrorism throughout the region. And it would mean that Turkey and its terrorist allies would be just one step away from sweeping across Libya to Egypt’s border, placing the Muslim Brotherhood and its terrorist protégés in prime position to launch attacks on Egypt, complementing their jihadist brethren in Sinai.

Meanwhile, thousands of miles away in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia will be watching and noting Sisi’s faltering nerves as it prepares to fill its Renaissance Dam without agreement with Cairo, thereby depriving Egypt of much of its lifeblood, Nile water.

This article first appeared in Dateline Libya, a Redress Information & Analysis page dedicated to the conflict in Libya.