Who is fighting the war on terror?
Back on 1 May 2015 I wrote an analysis on “Changing alliances and the national interest in the Middle East”. In this piece, I made the argument that, at least since September 2001 and the declaration of the “war on terror”, the defeat of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates has been a publicly stated national interest of the United States. This certainly has been the way it has been presented by almost continuous government pronouncements and media stories dedicated to this “war” over the years.
Given this goal, it logically follows that, with the evolution of Al-Qaeda-like organisations such as the so-called Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, those who also seek the destruction of such groups are America’s de facto allies in the “war on terror” and warrant our assistance. Likewise, those who openly or clandestinely support these religious fanatics are opponents of a central US national interest, and their relationship with the United States should at least be open to review.
Then came the shocker. Who has been and continues to actively oppose these Al-Qaeda derivatives with soldiers on the ground? It turns out to be, among others, Iran, Hezbollah and Bashar Assad’s Syrian government. Who are clandestinely aiding the Al-Qaeda enemies of Washington? It turns out to be Israel and Saudi Arabia. As I explain in my original analysis, this latter development has much to do with the fact that both the Israelis and the Saudis have decided that regime change in Syria is a high priority, even if it means Islamic State and Al-Nusra end up taking over Syria and, as Robert Parry puts it in “Madness of blockading Syria’s regime”, “chopping off the heads of Christians, Alawites, Shi’is and other ‘heretics’ and/or Al-Qaeda having a major Mideast capital from which to plot more attacks on the West”.
Has the US government, or for that matter the US media, brought this anomalous situation to the attention of the general public? No. Has Washington altered its policies in the region so as to ally with the actual anti-Al-Qaeda forces? Not at all. Why not? These are questions we will address in the Conclusion of this analysis. However, first we must look at a recent complicating factor.
Russia to the rescue
This screwball situation has now taken yet another turn. The Russian government, which also sees Al-Qaeda and its affiliates as a growing threat, has decided that the US will not meaningfully act against the religious fanatics now threatening Syria – a country with which it, Russia, has strong ties. Having come to this conclusion, Moscow has decided to take the initiative and increase its military assistance to Damascus. According to a New York Times (NYT) article of 5 September 2015, this includes bringing into Syria as many as a thousand military advisors and support staff. Russia already has a naval base at the port city of Tartus. Now it is establishing a presence at the main airbase outside the city of Latakia.
All of this has raised alarms in Washington. Secretary of State John Kerry, who has met several times with Russian officials about the Syrian civil war, was reported by the Philadelphia Inquirer on 10 September 2015 to have called his Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, to tell him that the Russian moves will only increase the level of violence rather than help promote a negotiated settlement. If this report is accurate, Kerry must have come across as rather lame. After over four years of protracted internecine slaughter, over 4 million refugees and numerous failed attempts at a negotiated a settlement, all one has as a result is the growth of rampaging religious fanatics who now control much of Syria and part of Iraq as well. It might just be the case that Moscow has come to the conclusion that a negotiated settlement is not possible, and what one really needs is a military victory that destroys organisations such as Islamic State and Al-Nusra.
Oddly, the US government seems to be alarmed at this prospect. No doubt this is because Moscow sees no reason to displace its ally, Bashar Assad, while “regime change” is a cause celebre for US and Israeli leaders. Washington has gone so far as to request NATO-affiliated countries to deny Russian transport planes permission to overfly their territory on their way to Syria. At least one such country, Bulgaria, has done just that. Fortunately, this does not really hamper the Russian effort. Iran, another enemy of Al-Qaeda, has granted permission for the overflights, thus opening up a convenient and more or less direct route for the Russian supply line.
The goal of destroying Al-Qaeda-like organisations is, supposedly, what the “war on terror” is all about. Nonetheless, the US government’s policies in this regard are inconsistent. Does the US want to destroy Al-Qaeda and its affiliates or not? The answer is, mostly, yes. However, something often holds the government back – something that the Russians don’t have to contend with.
That something breaks down into three parts: (1) longstanding, conservative Washington-based special interest lobbies, the most powerful of which is sponsored by Israel; (2) the pro-war neo-conservative elements within American society that often cooperate with these lobbies; and (3) an American military bureaucracy parts of which are committed to maintaining a system of land, air and naval bases situated mostly in dictatorial Middle East states hostile to both Russia and Syria. It is this combination of forces that prevents meaningful changes even as evolving realities would seem to demand them.
In other words, while Israel and Saudi Arabia can act in ways they consider to be in their national interests, their agents and allies in Washington exercise enough influence to discourage US policy makers from doing the same thing when it comes to the Middle East. That is why Washington is not pointing up the fact that two close “allies” are helping the same sort of people who attacked the World Trade Centre, while simultaneously chastising the Russians for actually acting forcefully against those same terrorists.
The inability to adjust to changing realities is a sure sign of decline, particularly for a “great power”. And, unfortunately that seems to be the situation for the US. At least at this point, one can only conclude that the Obama administration’s ability to secure the Iran nuclear agreement is an isolated example of realism. Current US policy toward Syria shows that Washington has not made the turnaround leading to a permanent clear-sighted ability to assess national interests in the Middle East.